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Understanding South Africa’s changing positions on International Criminal 
Justice: Why the country wanted to withdraw from the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) and why it may remain in the ICC for the time being?1
This article examines why the South African Government decided to withdraw from 
the Rome Statute for the ICC in 2016. South Africa’s history with international law 
and international justice are examined to indicate how these matters over time reflect 
South Africa’s political history and political developments. The next section of the article 
examines the role the United Nations Security Council plays in relation to the ICC and 
why that, along with other issues, has led to a greater reluctance by African countries to 
accept who is judged and who is not. Finally reviewed, is how South Africa’s position on 
international justice has changed over time, what has caused such change, and whether 
the country’s withdrawal from the ICC will occur in the future.
Keywords: International Criminal Court, South Africa, African Union, 
United Nations Security Council, international criminal justice, 
international law
Compreendendo as mudanças de posição da África do Sul sobre a justiça 
penal internacional: Por que o país quis retirar-se do Tribunal Penal 
Internacional (TPI) e por que pode permanecer no TPI por enquanto?
Este artigo examina o porquê da decisão do governo sul-africano de abandonar o 
Tribunal Penal Internacional (TPI) em 2016. A história da África do Sul no que toca ao 
direito internacional e à justiça internacional é examinada de modo a pôr em evidência 
como essas questões ao longo do tempo refletem a história e os desenvolvimentos políti-
cos que nela ocorreram. A secção seguinte do artigo analisa o papel que o Conselho de 
Segurança das Nações Unidas desempenha em relação ao TPI e por que isso, juntamente 
com outras questões, tem levado a uma maior relutância por parte dos países africanos em 
aceitar quem é julgado e quem não o é. Finalmente, é examinado como a posição da África 
do Sul sobre a justiça internacional se tem vindo a alterar ao longo do tempo, o que desen-
cadeou esta mudança, e é ponderado se a retirada do país do TPI virá a ter lugar no futuro.
Palavras-chave: Tribunal Penal Internacional, África do Sul, União Africana, 
Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, justiça penal 
internacional, direito internacional
Recebido: 31 de março de 2020
Aceite: 20 de novembro de 2020
1  My thanks to Xolani Khosa for his assistance with this article.
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South Africa has been in the news relating to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC or Court) for some time now. It has been involved in various ways in the dis-
putes between the African Union (AU) and the Court since 2009. In fact, however, 
the schism between Africa and the Court can be seen from 2005, although South 
Africa did not clearly state that it sided with the AU against the ICC until 2015 
(Arnould, 2017). While it was open about the dualist position it was taking sup-
porting both sides, it was clear by all the signs that in private South Africa was 
siding with the AU. South Africa’s position however only became crystal clear in 
2015 when then President al-Bashir entered South Africa (Bamfo, 2018) to attend 
the 25th African Union Summit. That event (Sarkin, 2015) generated a chain of 
events that then saw the South African Government on 21 October 2016 deciding 
to withdraw from the Rome statute of the ICC (Sarkin, 2017).
No one was consulted on that decision, but the South African Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development finally confirmed during a media brief-
ing that South Africa had submitted to the United Nations (UN) its notice of in-
tention to withdraw from the ICC. The decision by South Africa to withdraw 
from the ICC in 2016 was taken around the same time that Burundi and Gambia 
were also deciding on that matter (Ssenyonjo, 2018). The Philippines did with-
draw from the ICC in 2018, but that was because of the decision by the Court to 
open a case into Philippines President Duterte’s “war on drugs” and the extra-ju-
dicial killings that were alleged to be state sanctioned. Malaysia had on 4 March 
2019 ratified the Rome Statute and a month later in April 2019 backtracked on its 
decision and withdrew from the Rome Statute. The Malaysian Prime Minister 
stated that: 
There seems to be a lot of confusion about the Rome Statute, so we will not accede. 
This is not because we are against it, but because of the political confusion about 
what it entails, caused by people with vested interests. (Hamid, 2019)
The timing of the South African Government’s withdrawal decision may have 
been prompted by wanting to be the first country to withdraw from the Court. 
At the time, several states were considering doing so (Rossi, 2018). Withdrawing 
could therefore have been done then as a means to show some leadership to other 
African countries that were also considering this option. 
The reaction to the information about the South African Government’s inten-
tion was, from at least some, tremendous criticism. The South African Institute 
for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law 
(SAIFAC), the South African Research Chair in International Law (SARCIL) and 
the International Commission of Jurists made submissions to the South African 
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Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services, drawing 
the committee’s attention to what they considered an injudicious decision to 
withdraw from the ICC. Thereafter, several organisations lodged an application 
in the North Gauteng High Court to set aside the Government’s decision to with-
draw from the ICC. In that case, the applicants contended that the Government’s 
decision was taken precipitously without having first consulted and obtained 
parliamentary imprimatur, reminiscent of the position under apartheid law, 
where entering into, ratification of and withdrawing from international treaties 
was solely the executive’s prerogative and could be executed without the ap-
proval of Parliament. 
On 22 February 2017, the High Court delivered its judgment, in which it criti-
cised the Government’s conduct, declaring unconstitutional and invalid the exec-
utive’s decision to deliver to the UN South Africa’s notice of withdrawal from the 
ICC, and ordered the Government to rescind with immediate effect the said no-
tice. On 13 March 2017, the Justice Minister, in compliance with the court order, 
gave notice to Parliament that he was revoking the bill that, if signed into law, 
would have officially decreed the divorce, and severed the almost 20-year-old tie 
between South Africa and the ICC.
This article examines why the South African Government took the decision to 
withdraw from the ICC in 2016, why it has still not withdrawn, and whether it 
is likely to do so in the future. South Africa’s history with international law and 
international justice are examined to indicate how these matters over time reflect 
South Africa’s political history and political developments. The article notes that 
there was little regard for international law during the apartheid era. That posi-
tion changed, as the country became a democracy, but changed again as South 
Africa sought greater status and new political partners in such a quest. The rela-
tionship between the AU and the ICC is then examined to understand how and 
why South Africa’s position changed over time. The next section of the article 
examines the role the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) plays in relation 
to the ICC and why that, together with other issues, has led to a greater unhappi-
ness on the part of African countries who are states parties to the ICC about who 
is prosecuted and who is not. Finally, reviewed in the context of that background 
is how South Africa’s position on international justice has changed over time, 
what has caused such change, and whether the country’s withdrawal from the 
ICC will occur in the future.
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The historical context of South Africa and international law
In 1994, following the end of apartheid, South Africa became a constitutional 
democracy. When the two new democratic and transformative constitutions were 
adopted in 1993 and 1996 respectively, they represented the end of the struggle 
for liberation against a despotic regime whose egregious violations of basic hu-
man rights shocked the collective conscience of nations around the world. The 
new democratic polity knew that it had to take steps to avoid the past perpe-
tration of crimes against humanity and other human rights abuses. Thus, the 
new Government began the process of building a “united and democratic South 
Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations” 
(South Africa, 1996).
With that in mind, and the need to ensure the significance of international 
legal norms in domestic law, section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa 108 of 1996 enjoins the domestic courts to consider international 
law when interpreting the Bill of Rights, and section 233 further provides that 
“[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable in-
terpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.” Thus, the 
Constitution became the iconic symbol of South Africa’s commitment to uphold-
ing the rule of law, and protecting and advancing international human rights.
In this context, it was therefore no surprise when, on 17 July 1998, South 
Africa signed, and, on 27 November 2000, deposited its instrument of ratification 
in terms of article 125 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
South Africa elected to be in the company of the sovereign states that, by imple-
menting the Rome Statute nationally on 16 August 2002, undertook and commit-
ted to cooperate with the ICC to bring international criminals to trial for offences 
that fell within the remit of the Court. South Africa, as a democracy based on 
constitutional supremacy and as an active member of the international commu-
nity that observes international customary norms, recognises and upholds the 
doctrine of head-of-state immunity as a settled practice amongst nations of the 
world (Gaeta, 2009).
South Africa was a keen supporter of the ICC, as were many other African 
countries (Rukooko & Silverman, 2019) way before the Court came into exist-
ence. It supported the process to establish the Court and played a critical role 
during the drafting of the Rome Statute at the conference to set up the Court in 
1998 (Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, 2002). Former President 
Nelson Mandela played a key role in that regard, as did many other South 
Africans (Mandela, 2004).
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The African Union versus the ICC
The role of the ICC on the African continent is very controversial (García 
Iommi, 2020). The ICC’s role is seen to aim at only the weaker countries, mainly 
in Africa (Du Plessis, 2013), and that the larger and more powerful states are able 
to avoid accountability for their actions, including Russia, China, India, and the 
United States (Ndubuisi & Onoriode, 2018). 
While the forerunner of the AU, the Organization of African Union, was a 
major supporter of the creation of the ICC, more and more African countries and 
the AU itself are now opposed to the Court (Abass, 2013). The AU has become 
ardently in favour (Swart & Krisch, 2014) of African states leaving the Court. The 
feelings against the ICC have grown over the last decade or so. Those sentiments 
were originally about the attempts by the Court to prosecute the presidents of 
Sudan and Kenya. 
In October 2013, the AU called an extraordinary session of the Assembly of the 
African Union that dealt with the continent’s relationship with the ICC in the con-
text of international justice (Vilmer, 2016). It decided to urgently request deferral 
of the Kenyan cases. The AU’s position hardened when the letter to the Security 
Council requesting the deferral was unheeded and in fact not even acknowl-
edged. The AU’s case against the ICC was further strengthened by the events in 
South Africa in 2015 over attempts by the ICC to get South Africa to arrest then 
President al-Bashir of Sudan. 
There is a wider context to the issues concerning the way the AU views the 
ICC (Sarkin, 2016a). There have long been allegations of bias on the part of the 
ICC (Austin & Thieme, 2016) against Africa (Benyera, 2018), but more recent has 
been the view that the ICC is a neo-colonialist institution (Labuda, 2014) doing 
the bidding of the Global North (Maklanron, 2016). It has also been asked why 
African states should be held accountable when many of the powerful states in-
cluding the USA, Russia, China, India, etc. refuse to be (Ssekandi & Tesfay, 2017). 
The indictment of President al-Bashir was seen to cement that position, as Sudan 
is not a state party to the Rome Statute (de Wet, 2015). Thus, the fact that the 
Security Council with many non-member ICC states did the referral, rendered 
to many that decision illegitimate, and highlighted the position of imperialism 
(Condorelli & Ciampi, 2005). The alleged abuse of power in the hands of the so-
called “P5 members” of the UNSC and the perceived conflict between states par-
ties’ international obligations and domestic and regional political interests did 
not bode well for the Court’s legitimacy (Fisher, 2018) and reputation in Africa 
(Dutton, 2017). However, those who do not want the Court to take up such cases 
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have used the issues concerning the ICC in Africa for political purposes. As South 
African Archbishop Tutu has stated: 
I regret that the charges against President Bashir are being used to stir up the sen-
timent that the justice system – and in particular, the international court – is biased 
against Africa. Justice is in the interest of victims, and the victims of these crimes 
are African. To imply that the prosecution is a plot by the West is demeaning to 
Africans and understates the commitment to justice we have seen across the conti-
nent. (Tutu, Cape Times, 2009) 
The fact, however, is that the anti-ICC sentiment has taken hold across Africa. 
Much needs to be done to improve this situation by educating stakeholders on 
the role and function of the Court and why the Court is essential for deterrence 
(Sarkin, 2011-2012). This will be returned to. 
Regardless, some have been highly critical of the development of internation-
al criminal justice in general, and that of the ICC specifically, because they see 
this as a degradation of sovereignty. The Court is contentious, at least in part, 
because a majority of its cases concern only Africa (Cannon et al., 2016). It has no 
cases from elsewhere, hence the criticism that it is biased against the developing 
world and favours developed countries (Niang, 2018). The Court is currently 
addressing various “situations” or cases, including Uganda, Mali, Ivory Coast, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), 
Kenya, Libya and Sudan. Five cases were referred to the ICC by the governments 
of those countries. The Security Council referred two cases to the ICC. Such refer-
rals are very controversial, because of the powers and membership of the Council 
are not seen by many to be democratic and rather reflect the world as it was in 
1945 (Sarkin, 2019).
For those reasons, the AU (Chigara & Nwankwo, 2015, p. 247) has raised the 
issue of bias by the Court against African states (Mills & Bloomfield, 2018). There 
has been widespread concern among the 33 African state parties to the Rome 
Statute, which include South Africa, that the ICC is “hunting” African leaders 
(Gaeta & Labuda, 2017) almost to the exclusion of any other head of state or gov-
ernment official elsewhere in the Global North. 
Thus, there has been a growing call among many African states to sever ties 
with the ICC. This is particularly evinced by the refusal or failure of “Uganda, 
Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi, Congo, South Africa, and Egypt to be involved in 
detaining and surrendering President Al Bashir to the ICC” (Chigara & Nwankyo, 
2015, p. 246). 
98 Understanding South Africa’s changing positions on international criminal justice
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos  •  julho-dezembro de 2020  •  40, 91-114
The AU became increasingly oppositional and recalcitrant towards the Court 
(Sarkin, 2018). At the extraordinary session of the AU’s summit of heads of state 
in Addis Ababa in 2013, the AU avowed its position against the prosecution of 
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, citing disproportionate prosecuting patterns. 
The AU asserted that it would not allow a sitting head of state to be prosecuted 
by an international body. 
As a result, the AU has sought to extend the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights (ACJHR)’s adjudicative power to try international crimes (Tilden, 
2018) while at the same time providing for immunity (Akande & Shah, 2010) in 
such cases for heads of state and other state officials in terms of Article 46A bis 
of the 2014 Protocol Amendments of the AU. Thus, the AU endorsed the propo-
sition to expand the mandate of the ACJHR (which merged the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and Court of Justice of the African Union) 
so the Court can have the jurisdiction to try international crimes (Asaala, 2017). 
The developments concerning the ICC and Africa came to a head in 2016, 
which was a critical year for the ICC. It was the year that African countries be-
gan to seek to withdraw from the Court (Magliveras, 2019). Three African coun-
tries (South Africa, The Gambia and Burundi) began the process to leave the 
Court, and a number of others, including Uganda, Namibia and Kenya (Helfer & 
Showalter, 2017) were seen to be moving in that direction. 
The ICC has categorically denied any accusations of “partiality”, arguing that 
the sum of African cases referred to the ICC has more to do with the Court’s 
jurisdiction being limited to states parties to the Rome Statute, and for crimes 
committed after 2002. In addition, while other cases have been investigated, they 
have lacked the ability to graduate to a trial because of a lack of evidence or some 
other deficiency. ICC spokesperson, Fadi El Abdallah, has stated that: 
[o]f the current cases on the prosecutor’s desk, all but two were brought to the ICC 
by the states themselves, including when national justice systems have failed. In 
the cases of Libya and Sudan, the investigations were referred to the Prosecutor’s 
Office after a vote by the UN Security Council, votes in which African countries 
participated. (Chutel, 2016) 
The fact of the matter is that of the first ten situations that were investigated by 
the ICC, nine of those were African states: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
(referred to the ICC by the DRC Government in April 2004); Uganda (referred to 
the ICC by Uganda in January 2004); Central African Republic (CAR) (referred to 
the ICC by the CAR Government in December 2004); Darfur, Sudan (referred to 
the ICC by the UNSC in March 2005); Kenya (ICC Prosecutor opened propio motu 
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investigation in March 2010); Libya (referred to the ICC by the UNSC in February 
2011); Côte d’Ivoire (accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction in April 2003); Mali (referred 
to the ICC by the Government of Mali in January 2004); and CAR II (referred to 
the ICC by the CAR Government in December 2014). Thus, many of the cases were 
in fact self-referrals by the countries themselves. In other words, it was not the 
ICC deciding to investigate but the country itself asking for the events there to be 
taken up by the Court.
The controversial role of the Security Council with respect 
to the ICC
The Security Council has been given various powers in connection with the 
ICC (Schiff, 2008). The key issue has been stated as follows: 
[I]n principle, it is questioned how those non-party states, especially from among 
the permanent members of the Council (P5 member states), can justify their excep-
tionalism, namely of subjecting to the Court another state not party while they do 
not accept the Court’s jurisdiction over themselves. Thus, many question whether, 
through Security Council referrals, the ICC becomes a policy tool to advance the 
political interests of those states represented on the Security Council. (Mistry & 
Verduzco, 2012)
Problematically, the Permanent Council has a membership that still reflects 
the geopolitics of the so-called superpowers immediately after the Second World 
War (Cryer, 1996), at the exclusion of the rest of the world. It has been argued 
that: 
[t]he configuration of the Security Council not only mirrors the political and eco-
nomic reality of 1945, but it is also an increasingly delegitimized center of power. 
On the other hand, the ICC’s lack of total independence from politicization as well 
as its statutory limitations threatens its primary objective of holding individuals 
accountable for abuses. Therefore, these two global institutions urgently need to 
reform their backward and obsolete interpretation of power that only perpetuates 
the status quo. (Jimenez, 2012, p. 86) 
Among the P5 member states, only France and the UK are States Parties to the 
Rome Statute. Previous signatories the US (Groenleer, 2015, p. 924) and Russia 
(Seyapin, 2016) opted out and withdrew their intention to ratify. China has nei-
ther signed nor ratified the Statute. 
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In this context, there is strong criticism of what many perceive to be a very 
dangerous configuration of power politics inherent in the referral and deferral 
mechanisms between the Council and the ICC. The question may very well be 
asked: why is it that the subject of international peace and security is the concern 
of all member states, but when it comes to the subject of taking the decisions 
whether or not to refer or defer matters and the adoption of resolutions in respect 
thereof, the discretionary power essentially falls only within the province of per-
manent members of the Security Council (Babington-Ashaye, 2014)?
The significant issue is how can some member states be vested with the power 
to cause the commencement or the suspension of an investigation or prosecution 
of cases under the Rome Statute, but themselves reject, and not be bound by, the 
Rome Statute? It is indeed accepted practice in treaty law that a state is bound 
to follow what that state has voluntarily agreed to. Similarly, member states, of 
their own volition, consented to be bound by the UN Charter by joining the UN. 
However, the exclusive concentration of veto power in the hands of the perma-
nent members (as determined in 1945 and no longer appropriate in the 21st cen-
tury) has given to a select few a far greater and more superior say than other 
member states when it comes to decisions about international peace and security. 
The situations referred to the ICC by means of the referral mechanism are in 
respect of signatory states of the UN Charter that did not consent to be bound 
by the Rome Statute, but are subjected to its authority and the jurisdiction of 
the ICC nonetheless (Keitner, 2018, p. 629). However, many of the permanent 
members of the Security Council do not themselves submit to the authority of the 
Rome Statute and the jurisdiction of the ICC. Nevertheless, they have the power 
to choose when to and when not to abide (Du Plessis & Gevers, 2018).
The fact is that these states are willing to impose the ICC on some states, like 
Sudan, but reject attempts to do so for themselves (Yigzaw, 2018, p. 204). In fact 
they have taken steps in the Security Council to block possible cases against their 
own citizens. In 2003, the Security Council adopted United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1487. This was a renewal of UNSCR 1422 pursuant 
to Article 162 of the Statute, which granted US soldiers and other UN peacekeep-
ing personnel a 12-month immunity from the ICC. This can be renewed annually. 
This immunity further attenuated and undercut the Court’s efforts to bring war 
criminals to justice. 
2  Article 16 of the Rome Statute makes provision for the “Deferral of investigation and prosecution”. It states 
that “[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 
12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions.” 
101Jeremy Julian Sarkin
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos  •  julho-dezembro de 2020  •  40, 91-114
This resolution drew the following response from the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe (PACE). It held that the Resolution 
constitutes a legally questionable and politically damaging interference with the 
functioning of the International Criminal Court. Its independence from the UN 
Security Council, with regard to the opening of procedures against persons sus-
pected of international crimes […] is legally questionable for two reasons: firstly, it 
is ultra vires in that the legal basis for a Security Council Resolution under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter – a present threat to international peace and security – was 
not present. Secondly, Resolution 1422 violates the Rome Statute (Articles 16 and 
27). The Assembly considers that Article 16 does not cover blanket immunity in 
relation to unknown, future situations. It further recalls that Article 27 of the Rome 
Statute expressly prohibits making distinctions on the basis of official capacity in 
order to ensure that no person is above the law. The Assembly considers that this 
should also apply to UN peacekeepers, independently from their nationality. 
The Assembly also resolved that it 
regrets the ongoing campaign by the United States to convince State Parties to 
the Rome Statute, including member states of the Council of Europe, to enter into 
bilateral agreements aimed at subjecting these states’ cooperation with the ICC, as 
regards United States citizens accused of crimes giving rise to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC, to prior agreement by the United States Government.
The USA’s tactics in handling international criminal prosecution and justice 
matters illustrates the extent to which some states have gone to protect their do-
mestic political interests and bilateral relations. This observation seems to give 
traction and lend credence to the view expressed by many African states that the 
ICC is a ploy by the West to achieve political ends (Nel & Sibiya, 2017).
This situation is exacerbated by what is perceived and promoted by African 
states as the Council’s attitude of deep disrespect towards African issues. It has 
also been argued that a culture permeates the ICC’s operations that: “comes with 
a prejudice and a hubris and an arrogance that has left a very bitter taste in the 
mouth of African states” (Chutel, 2016). These perceptions have grown over time 
but also as some African states have tried to push back against the role of the ICC.
South Africa’s relationship with the ICC: past, present and 
future
South Africa’s relationship with the ICC must be seen in different time periods 
(Alden & Le Pere, 2004). South Africa had a very problematic role with the inter-
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national community prior to 1994 (Black, 2001). It had an abnormal position with 
international law during apartheid (Botha, 1992). 
The country was seen to be a pariah state, even though it tried to work within 
the confines of international law. This affected the way it viewed the internation-
al community in general and international justice in particular. While it was a 
founder of the League of Nations and the United Nations and was given a man-
date over South West Africa (SWA) during World War I, it lost the support of the 
international community over its apartheid policies and its actions concerning 
the SWA mandate. 
Significantly, in 1974, South Africa became the first country to have its cre-
dentials rejected at the UN. As a result, its voting rights were suspended in the 
General Assembly until 1994. Sanctions were levelled against it under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. A result of this was that South Africa came to view the 
international community as hostile towards it, and it reacted to international pro-
cesses accordingly.
South Africa accepted few treaties. It was however a party to The Hague 
Regulations of 1907 and the four Geneva Conventions, which it ratified in 1952. 
Despite this, it refused to adopt the 1977 Additional Protocols (South Africa fi-
nally did so in 1995), fearing its applicability to the South African conflict. South 
Africa however only domesticated the Geneva Conventions in 2012 when it en-
acted the Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act. Interestingly, in 1980 
the ANC signed a declaration affirming its adherence to the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol I.
South Africa refused to engage with the international community on human 
rights matters. It did not have any concerns about international criminal justice 
because there were no institutions to hold South Africans criminally responsible 
for what were deemed international crimes. 
That position changed in 1994 when South Africa regained its positive inter-
national status and sought to play an international role (Carlsnaes & Nel, 2006). 
It rapidly ratified a number of human rights treaties (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). 
During the years of President Mandela’s tenure, South Africa played a strong 
supportive role in international criminal justice. Its role was recognised when 
one of its judges, Richard Goldstone, was appointed the first prosecutor of the 
two ad hoc international criminal tribunals. South Africa played a key role in the 
establishment of the ICC. It was one of the first countries to sign the Rome Statute 
on 17 July 1998 (Stone, 2018), and the first African state to do so (Rakate, 1998, 
p. 217). It formally joined the Court on 27 November 2000 and subsequently en-
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acted the Implementation Act (Katz, 2003), which came into force in August 2002 
(Du Plessis, 2003).
After the Mandela years, there was a shift in South Africa’s foreign policy, 
with human rights no longer being so firmly advanced and not standing so high 
on the agenda as had previously been the case. As Southall noted, “the human 
rights, moralistic orientation of South Africa’s early post-1994 foreign policy 
has been subordinated to pragmatic, regional concerns and African solidarity” 
(Southall, 2003, p. 269). Even Mandela himself in 2004 noted the shift when he 
wrote: 
Just over 10 years ago, apartheid South Africa was an outlaw, an outcast from the 
community of nations. As we rejoice at the achievement of democracy and free-
dom, we also celebrate our elevation to global partner and a champion for Africa 
and other developing nations, and a bridge between North and South. (Mandela, 
2004) 
South Africa’s role since has not been one of active engagement with respect 
to international criminal justice generally. South Africa is now not seemingly 
supportive of the Court. It has sided with the African Union and supports AU res-
olutions on the ICC. South Africa has not been cooperating with the ICC: this can 
be seen specifically in 2009 when the country approved an AU decision not coop-
erate with the ICC to arrest President al-Bashir. This position was later changed 
after an outcry in the country, but the writing was on the wall about where South 
Africa’s sympathies lay. 
South Africa, under the presidencies of Thabo Mbeki and definitely under 
Jacob Zuma (Langa & Shai, 2019), was generally reluctant to take up human 
rights matters especially when other African countries or Russia or China did 
not do so (Mangu, 2015). When it was a member of the Security Council be-
fore, South Africa refused to support action against India, Iran, Zimbabwe and 
Myanmar (Burma) (Van Nieuwkerk, 2007). These refusals were very controver-
sial and contrary to human rights protection. South Africa frequently voted to-
gether with Russia and China. This pattern was also apparent when South Africa 
again served on the Security Council in 2011 and 2012. This can also be seen in 
the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly: on these occasions, South 
Africa argued that it took these positions for procedural and intuitional reasons 
rather than because of its stance on international justice issues.
At times, however, the courts in the country forced the Government to adopt 
different stances, including on torture in Zimbabwe (Chenwi & Sucker, 2015). 
The South African Government had refused to investigate these matters be-
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fore the courts were approached. In fact, the South African Government on a 
number of occasions refused to comply with various international obligations 
(Venter, 2019) that they were then forced to do so by the courts. Again, when the 
Government refused to uphold the decisions of the South African Development 
Community (SADC) Tribunal against Zimbabwe, court action was necessary to 
achieve that result. South Africa also refused to hand over a report that contra-
dicted another favourable report on how Zimbabwe’s 2002 elections were con-
ducted. The writers of that report, South African judges Dikgang Moseneke and 
Sisi Khampepe, had been sent by then South African President Thabo Mbeki to 
monitor Zimbabwe’s elections. The report indicated that there were many trib-
ulations in those elections, and refuted the more optimistic report by the official 
South African election-monitoring delegation. The resulting litigation, to stop 
that report becoming public, lasted 15 years, and millions of dollars were ex-
pended in legal costs.
Another negative stance adopted by the South African Government was its 
support of the decimation of the SADC Tribunal (Sarkin, 2016b). It supported the 
removal of the Court’s jurisdiction to hear individual complaints and the refusal 
to appoint new judges or extend the tenure of the sitting judges, thereby ensuring 
that the Court did not have the requisite judges to allow it to sit. 
Many times, South Africa took positions in international institutions against 
accountability. It often did so pleading some procedural point or that the position 
being taken by the country was because specific processes had to be, or ought to 
be, followed. It often cited peace processes as a reason not to support steps being 
taken against states that were violating human rights of their citizens (Prorok, 
2017). There were also attempts to prosecute leaders from other countries for hu-
man rights violations who were in the country. These included former President 
Aristide of Haiti, former Madagascan President Marc Ravalomanana, Foreign 
Minister Tzipi Livni of Israel, and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. 
None of these individuals were arrested in the country even though some of 
them resided there for a while. The upshot was that South Africa seldom sided 
with the victims in countries where abuses were being carried out. However, it 
was also seldom clear about its motivations and its stance supporting the AU 
position generally on such issues.
The ambivalence in the South African state’s position became clear when 
then Sudanese President al-Bashir arrived at the AU Summit in Johannesburg on 
Saturday 13 June 2015 (Sarkin, 2016c). South Africa was supposedly duty bound, 
as a state party to the ICC, to cooperate with the ICC by arresting him and sur-
rendering him to the ICC (Tladi, 2015). Thus, al-Bashir’s entrance into the country 
105Jeremy Julian Sarkin
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos  •  julho-dezembro de 2020  •  40, 91-114
was a test of what South Africa’s true position on the ICC was. While it often 
muttered platitudes in favour of the ICC, it joined the African Union’s resolutions 
on non-cooperation with the ICC. It did show its hand by endeavouring to give 
al-Bashir immunity before his arrival, understanding that this was going to be 
an issue (van Wyk, 2019). More than that, the Government did all in its power to 
obfuscate the ICC by using a range of delaying tactics when the ICC tried to get 
the state to comply with its obligations, knowing that al-Bashir was going to visit 
the country. 
These stances were taken, as South Africa has wanted to play a significant role 
in international affairs. It has taken on positions in the Non-Aligned Movement, 
in BRICS3 (Besada et al., 2013), in the African Union, and with Russia and China, 
to seemingly improve its international standing in those quarters (Volchkova & 
Ryabtseva, 2013). South Africa has sought a greater role, and specifically a great-
er leadership role, in international affairs in general and in Africa in particular. 
It has played key roles in the establishment of the African Renaissance and the 
African Peer Review Mechanism. It wants a leadership role in the African Union, 
and with other African states. For those reasons, at times at least, it takes posi-
tions that are seemingly contrarian to its Constitution and its espoused positions 
on human rights matters that it ought to take because of its apartheid past where 
massive human rights violations occurred. 
Despite its past, South Africa’s position in the ICC is tied to its grander in-
ternational aspirations. It has been developing its interests and relationships 
with those who it believes will assist its causes, be they economic, diplomatic, 
etc. Those actors have exerted, at times, enormous influence on South Africa’s 
stance on certain matters (Isike & Ogunnubi, 2017), including human rights ones 
(Carmody, 2016). Thus, South Africa’s relationships with Russia and China, in-
dividually and through BRICS, have had an enormous impact on the positions it 
has taken, to the detriment of its human rights values and international obliga-
tions. In this regard, Volchkova and Ryabtseva believe that:
The BRICS forum might play an important role in promoting South Africa’s role on 
the continent. For example, Russia believes it is possible to increase South Africa’s 
influence among its neighbours and in the overall global economic arena through 
the development of a national currency exchange within BRICS. If the BRICS coun-
tries manage to execute trade in national currencies, all remaining African coun-
tries might settle accounts with Russia, Brazil, India and China in South African 
Rands. (Volchkova & Ryabtseva, 2013, p. 135) 
3  Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa.
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The alliance with BRICS, and specifically Russia and China, has had important 
effects on South Africa. The country has been much more willing to support the 
matters of concern to these countries. An example is South Africa’s enduring and 
repeated rejection of the Dalai Lama’s attempts to get a visa to visit the country. 
South Africa has continuously claimed that delays were to blame in not granting 
him a visa. However, in fact the Chinese stance on the Dalai Lama, and issues 
concerning Tibet, have been behind this.
South Africa has however seemingly recently been more willing at times to 
put distance between itself and China, possibly because of the change in the pres-
idency. This can be seen during South Africa’s 2019-2020 tenure on the Security 
Council. During the first year on the Council, while being somewhat supportive 
of the positions of Russia and China initially during the rest of the first year, it 
showed greater independence and willingness to separate from those countries’ 
positions later on. This is the case, despite the close economic ties between espe-
cially China and South Africa (Thompson, 2019), and in fact between China and 
Africa more generally (Aiping & Zhan, 2018, p. 88). Thus, South Africa allowed 
into the country the exiled president of the Tibetan government, Lobsang Sangay, 
and refused to expel him when China demanded that it did (Shinn & Eisenman, 
2020). In fact, the Chinese issued a very strongly worded statement, which, in 
part, read that Sangay’s travel to South Africa had undermined the political trust 
between China and South Africa:
It has sent a wrong political signal to the world community, and has undermined 
the political mutual trust between China and South Africa. It runs against the com-
mon interest of SA-China relations, and will undoubtedly discourage Chinese in-
vestors’ confidence in South Africa, undermine SA’s efforts for poverty reduction, 
and cause grave harm for the interest of South Africa and the South African people. 
(Tibetan Review, 2018). 
Relations between South Africa and China have also been somewhat strained 
over the last few years because of issues concerning delays in the granting of 
loans by China to the South African power utility Eskom (Magubane, 2019). 
China has complained publicly about security issues in the country, the difficulty 
in obtaining visas, the state of South Africa’s laws, particularly for investors, and 
how the problematic state of South Africa’s infrastructure is affecting Chinese 
economic interests (China Embassy, 2019). It was also unhappy that there have 
been delays in appointing a South African ambassador to China.
Thus, a key determinant in South Africa’s position on international justice is-
sues is what its ambitions are. After the courts declared the process to withdraw 
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from the ICC unlawful (Du Plessis & Mettraux, 2017), the Government stated that 
it was committed to doing the process properly (Kemp, 2017, p. 411). It realised 
that it had to repeal the Implementation Act. Thus, the International Crimes Bill 
was introduced to Parliament during the tenure of Jacob Zuma in 2017 (Wabwile, 
2018). However, the Bill languished for more than two years. It was revived in 
2019 but it has been stated that: 
it seems the International Crimes Bill was ‘revived’ procedurally rather than with 
deliberate intent. All business before Parliament lapsed with the previous admin-
istration before the May elections. And so on 29 October all of that business was 
revived with a blanket resolution. It seems [President] Ramaphosa and [Justice 
Minister] Lamola are still kicking the ICC can down the road, and the bill is un-
likely to make it onto the justice portfolio committee’s heavy workload this year. 
(Fabricius, 2019) 
In December 2019, the Government of South Africa made a statement at the 
ICC Assembly of State Parties that included the position that: “we are still delib-
erating on the issue of withdrawal from the Rome Statute as the matter is still to 
be considered by our Parliament” (South Africa, 2019). Thus, it seems that there 
is no clarity even within the Government’s own ranks about what will occur and 
whether South Africa will withdraw from the ICC or not.
There are thus signs that there has been a softening on the issues of interna-
tional criminal justice by the South African Government (Reinold, 2019). This has 
come about in part because of a change in the presidency. Nowadays, President 
Cyril Ramaphosa seems less in favour of South Africa’s withdrawal (Soler, 2019). 
There is therefore less clarity over whether South Africa will withdraw from the 
ICC. This is not to argue that the anger towards the Court has subsided or that 
the attitudes towards the Security Council’s role have changed. In fact, they may 
have hardened. But reality may have set in (Perez-Leon-Acevedo, 2018). There 
is a realisation that the merged African Court with criminal jurisdiction may be 
a long way off because the required ratifications will take many years to occur. 
While the Protocol only requires 15 signatures to ratify it for the African Court 
to come into force, as of 2020 the Protocol has only been signed by 15 of the 
55 African states (Benin, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, and Uganda). None have rat-
ified the Protocol. Crucially, the trend towards withdrawing seems to have been 
suspended for the time being. Other African states that were previously on the 
brink of withdrawing have seemingly stepped back. South Africa’s future role 
with the Court is thus unclear. South Africa may try to walk the tightrope again 
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in its quest for a high-profile international relations role. However, that possi-
bility does seem to have been dented by internal and external factors that have 
curbed the country’s ambitions and possibilities. The fact that South Africa is a 
member of the Security Council for 2019 and 2020 and that it chairs the AU in 
2020 may also mean that it is more reluctant to take a position one way or the oth-
er on ICC withdrawal at the moment. South Africa is trying at present to reflect 
a more independent position internationally to try and regain its credibility and 
profile that it seemingly lost globally during the years of the Zuma presidency. 
Not withdrawing at present from the ICC, seems to be way that the South African 
Government believes may increase its international standing, while not causing 
it more difficulties with its Russian, Chinese and African friends.
Conclusion
South Africa’s position in the international community and with regard to 
international issues in general, and in particular on international criminal justice 
matters, has dramatically changed over the years. Much of this change has not 
been publicly debated and seems to have rather been positions taken by the ANC, 
with little external consultation. Even in Parliament, a stance tends to be adopted 
after an event, rather than putting a position on the table beforehand. Even on 
positions taken at the UN, there has been an absence of debate until after the fact. 
While South Africa was an outcast in the years before 1994, after the advent of 
democracy it became a key player in the community of nations in general, and 
on justice issues specifically. However, its commitment to human rights and jus-
tice as eminent concerns in the post-1994 era gave way to a greater focus on its 
political and economic interests. While South Africa played a key role on the ICC 
in the past, that role changed in the Mbeki and Zuma eras. Thus, the Mandela 
presidency was the high point of South Africa’s prioritising of human rights and 
international criminal justice in its foreign policy agenda. There was a shift dur-
ing the presidencies of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, in support of the critical 
camp of African states that saw the Court as biased towards the continent. South 
Africa’s stance mirrored those of the AU and BRICS (Bohler-Muller, 2013). The 
country’s role became pragmatic rather than principled. While there have been 
attempts to withdraw from the ICC by South Africa, the political landscape has 
changed domestically and internationally. Domestically, there is less interest to 
do so and the political and economic situation in the country militates against it. 
South Africa’s position internationally seems to also be against that happening, 
as efforts by other countries have not gone too far on this issue. 
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